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RECENT DECISIONS
his part. It is submitted that the decision of the appellate court is consistent
with the constitutional limitations which do very definitely affect the admin-
istration of relief by the courts under moratorium statutes.
OLIVER H. BASSUENER.
PRINCIPAL AND SURETY-STATUTORY BONDS-SUBROGATION.-The petitioner,
a surety company, gave a bond, required by statute, for the protection of mate-
rialmen and laborers participating in the drilling of a well for the United States
government. The latter's contracting officer was reguired to retain 10 per cent
of the estimated amount until completion and acceptance of the work. The con-
tractor finished the project, but he did not pay all the materialmen. The surety
paid into court the full amount of its bond, several thousand dollars less than
the contract price and inadequate to satisfy the claims of all materialmen. The
unpaid materialmen seek the retained percentage by virtue of an alleged equity
afforded by statute. The surety, by right of subrogation, lays claim as a general
creditor at least to the same fund for all of it or for a pro rata share. The
contractor having been adjudged a bankrupt, the government turned over the
sum to the trustee to abide the order of the court. The District Court gave prior-
ity to the materialmen, which decision was affirmed by the Circuit Court of
Appeals. 75 F. (2d) 377, (C.C.A. 2nd, 1935). On writ of certiorari, held, judgment
affirmed; acquittance under the bond did not leave the surety at liberty to prove
against the assets of the insolvent principal while any materialmen were unpaid.
Anmerican Surety Co. of New York v. Westinghouse Electric Mfg. Co., 56 Sup.
Ct. 9 (1935).
Subrogation must be enforced with a due regard to the equitable rights of
others and cannot be invoked to overthrow a superior or equal equity. Fraser v.
Fleming, 190 Mich. 238, 157 N.W. 269 (1916) ; Defiance Machine Works v. Gill,
170 Wis. 477, 175 N.W. 940 (1920). In New Amsterdam Casualty Co. v. City of
Astoria, 256 Fed. 560 (D.C. Or. 1919), the surety was denied recourse to the
retained. percentages because labor claims were not fully paid. To grant the
surety access to the fund would result in a reduction of the protection of the
bond to the extent of the surety's dividend in the assets of the debtor. Hamill v.
Kuchler, 203 Wis. 414, 234 N.W. 879 (1931). Statutes making mandatory a bond
to insure compensation to materialmen on public contract jobs were enacted as
a substitute for the ordinary materialmen's lien on private jobs. Visconsin Brick
Co. v. National Surety Co., 164 Wis. 585, 160 N.W. 1044 (1917) ; National Surety
Co. v. Bratnober, 67 Wash. 601, 122 Pac. 337 (1912). It is against public policy
that the instrumentalities for carrying on the government should be the subject
of seizure and sale for debt. National Fireproofing Co. v. Huntington, 81 Conn.
632, 71 Atl. 911 (1909). The security afforded by the bond has a substantial
tendency to lower the prices at which labor and material will be furnished. See
Equitable Surety Co. v. McMullan, 234 U. S. 448, 34 Sup. Ct. 803, 58 L.ed. 1394
(1914). It has been held traditionally that a material alteration of a contract
without the consent of the surety discharges the latter. Woodruff v. Schultc, 155
XMich. 11, 118 N.W. 579, 16 Ann. Cas. 346 (1908) ; Lonergan v. San Antonio Loan
Co., 101 Tex. 63, 104 S.W. 1061, 22 L.R.A. (N.S.) 364 (1907). And failure of
the owner to retain percentages when required by contract on a private building
project has been deemed a material alteration. Kunz v. Boll, 140 Wis. 69, 121
N.W. 601 (1909). But departures from the contract by the builder are not avail-
able to the surety as a defense against the claims of materialmen when they
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can invoke a statute enacted to protect them from the mismanagement and
insolvency of contractors. Webb v. Freng, 181 Wis. 39, 194 N.W. 155 (1923);
Maryland Casualty Co. v. Portland Construction Co., 71 F. (2d) 658 (C.C.A.
2nd, 1934). The rights of materialmen are unaffected by the acts of the owner
and the contractor. Standard Asphalt & Rubber Co. v. Texas Bldg. Co., 99 Kan.
567, 162 Pac. 299, L.R.A. 1917C 490 (1927) ; Victoria Lvmnber Co. v. Wells, 139
La. 500, 71 So. 781, L.R.A. 1916E 1110 (1916). However, one court has intimated
that if the changes made are so great as to amount to an abandonment of the
contract and the substitution of a substantially different one, so that persons
supplying labor and materials would necessarily be charged with notice, a differ-
ent result might be reached. Equitable Surety Co. v. United States, 234 U.S. 448,
34 Sup. Ct. 803, 58 L.ed. 1394 (1914).
The Wisconsin legislature has anticipated in some degree the probability of
disputes comparable to the one in the instant case. The legislature has pre-
scribed that the penalty of the bond on the public contract project shall not be
less than the contract price. Wis. STAT. (1933) § 289.16. And in Baumann v.
West Allis, 187 Wis. 506, 204 N.W. 907 (1925), the court, construing that statute,
declared that if the contract omits the protective provisions they will be imputed
to effectuate the legislative purpose.
LEONARD BESSMAN.
TORTS-CHARITABLE CORPORATIONS-SAFE PLACE STATUTE.-The plaintiff was
a member of the ladies aid society of the defendant congregation. While attend-
ing a meeting of this group at the church the plaintiff took a folding chair from
the top of a pile of chairs and was injured when the chairs toppled over and
fell upon her. The plaintiff brought an action for damages for personal injuries
against the congregation alleging a violation of the safe place statute [Wis.
STAT. (1933) § 101.06] in that the defendant's employees had permitted the
chairs to be carelessly piled inside the church building. The lower court sustained
a demurrer to the complaint. On appeal, held, order affirmed; there was no alle-
gation in the complaint as to any structural defect in the defendant's building.
Jaeger v. Evangelical Lutheran Congregation, (Wis. 1935) 262 N.W. 585.
A religious or other charitable corporation is not responsible for the negli-
gence of its employees. Bachman v. Y. M. C. A., 179 Wis. 178, 191 N.W. 751, 30
A.L.R. 448 (1922); cf. Hansen, Damage Liability of Charitable Corporations,
(1935) 19 MARQ. L. REV. 92. The safe place statute, supra, literally includes
within its terms every public building. To the extent that the employees of a
charitable corporation are delinquent in the care or maintenance of the structural
sufficiency of the buildings occupied by such corporations the latter may be held
to respond in damages to third persons. Wilson v. Evangelical Lutheran Church,
202 Wis. 111, 230 N.W. 708 (1930), where the employees of the church had
permitted a stairway into the basement of the building to remain improperly
lighted. But no responsibility can be imposed upon an administrative subdivision
of the state even when a structural defect is permitted to exist in a building used
in carrying on a public function. Srnka v. School District, 174 Wis. 38, 182 N.W.
325 (1921), where the administrative unit was a school district and where the
court decided that the maintenance of schools was a public function. Cf. Juul v.
School District, 168 Wis. 111, 169 N.W. 309 (1918). For a discussion of the
safe place statute and structural defects with respect to the responsibility of land-
lords to tenants and where no charitable corporations are involved see (1935)
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